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Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer by Victor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer.  (Basic 
Books, 2005).
 
In December 1961, Victor Cherkashin was a freshly-minted KGB officer working in 
Moscow for the Second Directorate, the division dedicated to thwarting British 
intelligence on Soviet soil.  Wrapping up his work before the New Year’s celebrations 
were to begin, Cherkashin got a call from a subordinate reporting that the wife of a 
British diplomat appeared to be having clandestine meetings with a Soviet officer.  After 
a few cat-and-mouse chases, Cherkashin and his colleagues figured out whom they 
were tailing.  Oleg Penkovsky, military intelligence officer and member of the Chief 
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, had betrayed the motherland.
 
It took nearly a year for the Soviets to be sure, but by October 1962 the KGB felt 
confident enough to arrest Penkovsky.  By that time, Penkovsky already had been able 
to play a part in the unfolding crisis in Western-Soviet relations prompted by the building 
of the Berlin Wall and the revelation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.  Penkovsky had 
revealed that the Cubans were armed with tactical nuclear warheads that could be fired 
without prior authorization from Moscow.  According to former National Security Council 
member David Major, this information kept Kennedy from invading Cuba as soon as the 
missiles were exposed.  For preventing a nuclear exchange, Major and others have 
dubbed Penkovsky "the spy who saved the world."
 
Victor Cherkashin isn’t so sure.  Even while under arrest in Moscow, Penkovsky had 
managed to signal to his British and American handlers that the Soviet Union was 
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preparing a nuclear first strike.  But in Spy Handler, his memoir of his years in Soviet 
intelligence, Cherkashin argues that this bit of intelligence, far from staying Kennedy's 
hand, would have inflamed the situation.  Fortunately, Cherkashin recalls, "Penkovsky's 
threat of a nuclear strike wasn’t conveyed to Kennedy, relieving him of the pressure to 
react."
 
It’s a small but telling moment in Cherkashin's fascinating account of his years in Soviet 
intelligence.  Cherkashin praises the CIA for steering Kennedy away from information 
that they worried would force him to react.  To Cherkashin, the heroes of the Cuban 
missile crisis were not the leaders on either side but rather their intelligence officers, 
who chose not to pass on information that they felt their bosses were not prepared to 
digest.
 
Cherkashin's assessment of the role intelligence played in diffusing the Cuban missile 
crisis is as revealing of the mechanisms of the Cold War as anything he recounts in his 
tales of running Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames.  As his record makes clear, 
Cherkashin was perhaps the greatest spy handler in the Soviet Union's history, 
shrewdly manipulating the informants in his care and the U.S. counter-intelligence 
officers determined to capture them.  But at a time when Russia is governed by a 
president who himself emerged from the KGB, it is Cherkashin's attitude toward Soviet 
history that is perhaps even more interesting.  Cherkashin was good at his job because 
he believed in it.  A reader doesn’t have to share those beliefs to recognize how they 
motivated men like Cherkashin to defend the power of the Soviet state for its own sake 
– even in disregard, if necessary, of that state’s subjects and its leaders. 
 
Ironically, Cherkashin, a man gripped to his soul by Soviet ideology, proved to be an 
excellent spy handler precisely because he discounted the role of political beliefs in 
motivating traitors.  Both Aldrich Ames and Richard Hanssen were men who felt their 
skills hadn’t been appreciated by their superiors.  Ames was motivated by money more 
than Hanssen, Cherkashin concluded, but neither betrayed the United States because 
they believed Soviet Communism was a genuine alternative.  This, Cherkashin argues, 
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is what convinced him of their sincerity.  Only FBI "dangles," i.e., fake traitors designed 
to ensnare Soviet operatives, ever lamented the evils of capitalism. 
 
Cherkashin's frank assessment of his clients makes Spy Handler an invaluable guide to 
the soul of a traitor.  He modestly argues that only sheer luck could have brought both 
Ames and Hanssen to the Soviet embassy during his tour in Washington, D.C.  But it 
was more than luck that got both spies on the Soviet hook and made both productive.  
Cherkashin's account of his early manipulation object, Ames, for example, reveals how 
well the Soviet spymaster used Ames' own approach to ensnare him.  Ames, then the 
CIA's chief of Soviet counterintelligence, had contacted the Soviets under the 
pseudonym Richard Wells.  Meeting "Wells" in a suburban bar, Cherkashin quickly 
convinced Ames to reveal his true identity.  How can we protect you, Cherkashin 
argued, if we don’t know who you are? 
 
Having successfully secured Ames’ name, Cherkashin then used Ames’ strong instinct 
for self-preservation to pry loose the names of CIA moles within the KGB.  "How can we 
protect you," Cherkashin argued, "if we don't know who's in a position to inform the CIA 
about you?"
 
At those words, Cherkashin recalls, Ames took out a pad of paper and wrote down a list 
of names – "a catalogue of virtually every asset within the Soviet Union."  Ames' 
impulsive revelation revealed more about CIA operations than any single previous 
communication, but such was the logic of betrayal that Cherkashin so skillfully 
manipulated.  "Just make sure these people don't find out anything about me," Ames 
said as he handed Cherkashin the list. 
 
They didn't, of course.  Dead men don't talk. 
 
Because Cherkashin's career took him from Australia to India to Lebanon to the States, 
Lubyanka and back, Spy Handler is a genuine tale of international intrigue, one full of 
dead-drops, microphones, "honey traps," double and triple agents and, of course, 
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executions – at least on the Soviet side.  Cherkashin and his co-author Gregory Feifer 
weave in these elements not as ostentatious color but rather as props and scenery of a 
far more interesting drama, one that reveals the nature of betrayal in a manner that 
would have done Graham Greene proud. 
 
In revealing Cherkashin's own motivations, Spy Handler is also, if unintentionally, a 
disturbing account of a mind so secure in its knowledge of others that it need not reflect 
on its own failings. 
 
Even the reader casually acquainted with Soviet history will find Cherkashin's historical 
backdrop to be grotesquely distorted.  As a young man, Cherkashin showed little 
curiosity about his father's work in the NKVD beyond a comforting sense that "he was a 
decent person in all respects and that whatever he did was honorable."  As a young 
intelligence officer during Khrushchev's thaw, Cherkashin was assigned to destroy files 
documenting the 1930s purges, lest some reform-minded Party official do to the NKVD 
what Khrushchev's secret speech had done to Stalin.  Cherkashin recalls coming across 
evidence that peasants were wrongly accused of treason and unjustly shot, but quickly 
puts this disturbing inside knowledge in perspective.  "Although I found many of the 
mistakes of the 1930s deplorable," Cherkashin remembers, "I also felt that they were 
unavoidable in building the foundation of the Soviet state." 
 
At every historical turn, Cherkashin finds reason to put the power of the Soviet state 
ahead of the interests of citizens of other nations, ahead of Soviet citizens – even, 
remarkably, ahead of the Soviet Union's own leaders.  The brutal crushing of the Prague 
Spring was, Cherkashin writes, a necessary fight against "Western attempts to turn 
socialist countries against Moscow."  The fall of Soviet Bloc governments in 1989 
prompts only dismay in Mikhail Gorbachev’s undoing of the Brezhnev Doctrine.  "I 
watched," Cherkashin recalls, "as decades of hard work and sacrifice by dedicated 
Eastern European communists were cast aside like dirty laundry." 
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Some might have thought Gorbachev's campaign against alcohol production and 
consumption was a decent attempt to improve Soviet life, but Cherkashin saw only the 
loss of revenue and thus harm done to the Soviet state.  When word of the 1991 coup 
spread, Cherkashin recalls, "a wave of joy washed over me.  Finally something was 
being done to stop Gorbachev’s destruction."  When the coup failed and citizens rallied 
to pull down the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Soviet police state, 
Cherkashin saw only a "senseless act – no better than the destruction of churches after 
the 1917 revolution." 
 
Cherkashin's compelling accounts of recruiting and manipulating spies appear, on the 
surface, to depend on a certain moral relativism.  Great spies were not motivated by 
ideology, Cherkashin convincingly argues.  In treating some of his opposite numbers in 
the CIA with respect, Cherkashin sometimes appears to be a mere engineer of human 
souls, interested in the mechanisms of power rather than the political order at stake.  
But Cherkashin's sincere laments at the loss of Soviet power, unblemished by a single 
reflection on what that power was used to achieve, reveal a true believer behind the 
engineer’s calculations.  The Soviet machine should have been preserved, Cherkashin 
argues, regardless of the purposes for which that machine had been used. 
 
Cherkashin's faith in the power of the Soviet apparatus gives his assessment of post-
cold war politics a chillingly totalitarian flavor.  The United States' "laughable liberation of 
Iraq," Cherkashin argues, had been ginned up by corrupted intelligence agencies.  The 
time has come, he concludes, for states to "somehow ensure that their intelligence 
services direct their activities toward achieving properly defined strategic goals instead 
of following their leaders' political intentions." 
 
At first glance, this statement might win some nods in the West.  Who wouldn’t prefer 
that intelligence agencies make non-partisan assessments?  But that, of course, is not 
what Cherkashin is saying.  He argues, instead, that the intelligence services should be 
setting the agenda regardless of what democratically elected leaders might wish to 
pursue.  Writing fourteen years after the failed 1991 coup, Cherkashin apparently has 
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not reconciled himself to a world in which the secret police are not in control of their 
fellow citizens' lives. 
 
Spy Handler is an extraordinary account of Cold War espionage in part because it 
shows that traitors were not motivated by ideology.  It is also extraordinary, if disturbing, 
in the extent to which it shows the obverse is true as well.  True believers in Soviet 
Communism would not, it seems, betray their country.  They would, Cherkashin 
inadvertently reveals, betray their humanity instead.
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